Summary: This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) 
Introduction
In cooperative game theory with transferable utilities (TU), the previous literature has focused on the question of how to split the grand coalition's payoff. This paper begins by asking a fundamentally different question: Is it always rational to split the grand coalition's payoff? If the answer is no, then in what games is it irrational to split the grand coalitional payoff?
The paper provides conclusive answers by exploring the possibility that players could achieve payoffs higher than the grand coalition's payoff, denoted as v(N). Such exploration leads to the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) for coalitional TU games and leads to the equivalence among three arguments: i) it is irrational to split v(N); ii) mgp is greater than v(N); and iii) the core of the game is empty. In other words, core existence in coalitional TU games can be understood by the rationality of splitting v(N), in addition to the known result that it is balanced (Bondareva [1962] , Shapley [1967] ) and that its v(N) is greater than the minimum no-blocking payoff (mnbp, Zhao [2001] ). Because game theory is the study of players' rationality, and because it is irrational to split v(N) in games with an empty core, the equivalence between empty core and the irrationality of splitting v(N) suggests the need to modify previous studies on splitting v(N), which has far-reaching implications for future research in cooperative game theory. In particular, it discourages future research on core enlargements such as the stable set, the bargaining set, and the ε-core, because such non-core splits of v(N) violate players' rationality.
The discovery of new generated payoffs allows us to answer four other (perhaps more important) questions: What payoffs will be split? How will the payoff be split? What coalitions will be formed? and How long will each of the coalitions be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games? Briefly answering these questions (in order), players will split the game's maximal payoff (mp), defined as the larger of v(N) and mgp; the set of stable splits of mp is equal to the core if it is rational to split v(N) (i.e., mgp≤ v(N) ) and equal to the optimal set for mnbp if otherwise (i.e., mgp> v(N) ); players will form coalitions in those minimal balanced collections that generate the game's mp; and each coalition in the formed collection will be formed for a length or percentage of time determined by the collection's unique balancing vector.
Finally, the paper obtains analogous results in coalitional non-transferable utilities (NTU) games. Due to the generality of non-transferable utilities, some of the NTU results are weaker than the corresponding TU results. In particular, the irrationality of choosing from the grand coalition's payoff set is only sufficient for an empty NTU core, although the irrationality of splitting v(N) is both necessary and sufficient for an empty TU core.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the known core results, section 3 studies the generated payoffs and reports a new core theorem, and section 4 studies the maximal payoff and establishes the coalition formation theory. Section 5 obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU games, section 6 concludes, and the appendix provides the proofs.
Description of the Problem
This section reviews the concept of the core and its known existence results in coalitional TU games. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players, and N = 2 N be the set of all coalitions. A TU game in coalitional form (or characteristic form), given below,
is a set function v: N → R + with v(∅) = 0, which specifies a joint payoff v(S) for each coalition S ∈ N. We use a lowercase v in v( . ) to define the above TU game (1), and an 4 uppercase V in V( . ) to define coalitional non-transferable utility (NTU) games in section 5.
A payoff vector is any x = (x 1 ,…, x n )∈ R n + , with x i as player i's payoff for each i∈ N.
} denote the set of payoff vectors that are splits of v(N), which is often called the preimputation or preimputation space (see Maschler [1992] for surveys). Given S∈N, a split x∈X(v(N) ) is unblocked by S if it gives S no less than v(S) (i.e.,
Σ i∈S x i ≥ v(S)), and it is in the core (or a core vector) if it is unblocked by all S≠ N. Denote the set of all core vectors for the game (1) as
We use a lowercase c in c(Γ) to denote TU core and an uppercase C in C(Γ) to denote NTU core in section 5. Given the game (1), Bondareva (1962) and Shapley (1969) showed that its core is non-empty if and only if it is balanced. A balanced game is defined below.
Given a collection of coalitions B = {T 1 , ..., T k } and a player i∈N, the subset of coalitions that include i as a member is B (i) = {T∈ B | i∈T}. B is a balanced collection (or balanced) if it has a balancing vector, which is a k-dimensional positive vector w∈ R k ++ such that Σ T∈B(i) w T = 1 for each i∈N. A balanced collection can be interpreted as a balanced assignment for assigning n students into k (1< k < n) Internet chat rooms (i.e., coalitions or discussion groups). Suppose that each student has one unit of total connection time (= 100 minutes) and could simultaneously join several chat rooms through several connections (i.e., by simultaneously logging onto several computers).
Define an assignment as a pair (B, w) of chat rooms and opening times, where B = {T 1 , ..., T k } is the set of chat rooms (T j ≠ ∅, all j), and for each T∈ B, w T > 0 is the length (or percentage) of time during which chat room T opens (i.e., it opens for 100× w T minutes). The set of chat rooms assigned to each student i is
In words, a balanced collection is a balanced assignment such that the total participation time for each student is precisely 100 minutes. Now, the game (1) is balanced if
for each balanced B with balancing vector w.
The equivalence between balancedness and the non-empty core was proved by applying the duality theorem to the following linear programming problem (see Myerson [1991], pp. 432-433, and Kannai [1992] , pp. 360-361): 1
The minimum no-blocking payoff (mnbp) for game (1) is defined as
The equivalence between v(N)≥ mnbp and non-empty core (Zhao [2001] ) is a refinement of the intuition that the core will be non-empty if v(N) is sufficiently large. 2 One advantage of the mnbp method is that it characterizes the core's interior: the core has a non-empty (relative) interior if and only if mnbp< v(N) holds.
Although the minimization problem (4) for mnbp differs from (3) only in that the grand coalition's constraint is removed, their duality results have completely different implications. As readers will see in the next two sections, the duality theorem for (4) not only provides a new argument for core existence, but it also answers four other (perhaps more important) questions: What payoffs will be split? How will the payoff be split? What coalitions will form? and How long will each of these coalitions be formed by rational players in our game (1) 
8 player is able to spend one half of his life before (or after) the game or spend two halves of his life simultaneously. Although imaginative, such a process is consistent with empirical evidence. In China's three-kingdom period (220-280 A.D.), for example, two players (Wei and Wu) lived long before the famous three-kingdom game was played.
Denote the maximal (or optimal) set for the above (5) as B 0 given below:
For each maximal collection B∈B 0 with its unique balancing vector w, it will generate the game's mgp when each T∈B is formed for w T units (or percentage) of the time.
Note that computing the above mgp is not an easy task for a large n, because the number of minimal balanced collections is much larger than the Bell number (i.e., the number of all partitions). 7 However, as shown in Theorem 1 below, one can obtain mgp by solving the simpler minimization problem (4) instead of solving (5), because the two problems are dual to each other.
Theorem 1: Given game (1), the maximization problem (5) for mgp is dual to the minimization problem (4) for mnbp, so mgp = mnbp holds.
Theorem 1 is proved in the appendix. Theorem 1 leads directly to three equivalent core theorems given below:
Theorem 2: Given game (1), let its core, mnbp, and mgp be given in (2), (4), and (5), respectively. Then, c(Γ) ≠ ∅ is equivalent to each of the following three claims:
(i) the game is balanced (Bondareva [1962] , Shapley [1967] ); (Zhao [2001] ); and
To summarize, there are now three necessary and sufficient empty-core arguments:
the game is unbalanced, v(N) is below mnbp, and it is irrational to split v(N). This indicates that previous results for splitting v(N) will be irrational whenever the core is empty, and it suggests the need to modify all previous studies on splitting v(N), including the more than 10 chapters on core and values in the handbook of game theory (Aumann and Hart [1992] ). In particular, it discourages any future research on core enlargements such as the stable set, the bargaining set, and ε-core, because such splits of v(N) violate players' rationality.
The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional TU Games
The previous section shows that rational players will not split v(N) in games with an empty core. Then, what payoffs will rational players split in games with an empty core? We propose that they will split the maximal payoff defined below:
Definition 2: The maximal payoff (mp) for game (1) is given by
where mgp = mgp(Γ) is the maximum of generated payoffs given in (5).
It is straightforward to see that
Because it is rational to split v(N) = mp if c(Γ) ≠ ∅, and mgp = mp >v(N) if c(Γ) = ∅,
rational players will always split a game's maximal payoff given in (8), and this answers the question of what payoffs will be split. As shown in Example 1, our three students will split the game's maximal payoff of mp = $1500, instead of v(N) = $1000.
Next, consider the question of how to split the maximal payoff. Let the optimal set for mnbp in (4) be denoted as Y given below: (ii) the set of rational splits of mp is given by
where c(Γ) and Y(Γ) are given respectively in (2) and (9); and (iii) the set of stable collections of coalitions that will be formed is given by
where B 0 (Γ) is given in (7) Observe that c * (Γ) ≠ ∅ always holds, so there always exists a split of the maximal payoff that is unblocked by any coalition or any balanced collection. It might be useful to call c * (Γ) in (10) the new core as compared with the old core c(Γ) in (2). In the old core, players split v(N) and only rule out deviations by each coalition, whereas in the new core, players split the maximal payoff and rule out not only deviations by each coalition, but also simultaneous deviations by each minimal balanced collection. In the Internet assignment game of Example 1, our three students will form each of the two-member chat rooms for 50 minutes and each will receive $500; such a split is stable against all possible deviations.
Extension to Conational NTU Games
This section answers the questions of what subset of payoffs from which players will choose, how players choose a payoff vector, what coalitions will form, and how long each of these coalitions will be formed in coalitional NTU games. Due to the generality of nontransferable utilities, some of these NTU results are weaker than the corresponding TU results. In particular, conditions for a non-empty NTU core are only sufficient but not necessary.
A coalitional NTU game, or an NTU game in characteristic form, is defined as
which specifies a non-empty set of payoffs, V(S)⊂ R S , for each S∈N, where R S is the Euclidean space whose dimension is the number of players in S and whose coordinates are the players in S. For each S∈ N, let the (weakly) efficient set of V(S) be given as
where vector inequalities are defined as below:
Scarf ( Given S∈ N, a payoff vector u∈ R n + is blocked by S if there is y∈ V(S) such that y >> u S (i.e., u S ∈V(S)\∂V(S)), or in words, if S can obtain a higher payoff for each of its members than that given by u. A payoff vector u∈∂V(N) is in the core if it is unblocked by all S ≠ N, so the core of (12) can be given as (13)
We now define the concept of a balanced NTU game (Scarf [1967b] ) geometrically.
For each S ≠ N, let ṽ (S) = V(S)×R
−S ⊂ R n denote the n-dimensional cylinder with V(S), where
Then, the set of payoffs generated by a minimal balanced B, and the set of generated payoffs can be defined as below:
Definition 3: Given a minimal balanced B ∈ B, the payoffs generated by B and the set of generated payoffs in (12) are given, respectively, as
GP(B) = ∩ S∈Bṽ (S) ⊂ R n , and
where B is the set of minimal balanced collections (excluding N) given in (6). 
Note that (14) becomes GP(B) = ∏ S∈B V(S) when

Now, the NTU game (12) is balanced if (16) GP(Γ)⊂ V(N)
holds, where GP(Γ) is the generated payoffs in (15), or in words, (12) (1, 2, 3) (2, 1, 2) (3, 2, 1)
(1, 2, 3) (3, 2, 1)
F ig u re 2 . Ba la nced a nd unba la nced ga m es. Figure 1 ). Similar to Example 1, players could achieve such new generated payoffs in GP (B 5 ) by forming each of the two-member coalitions for half of the time. Needless to say, it is the discovery of such new generated payoffs (or the maximum of generated payoff in Example 1) that gives rise to the coalition formation theory introduced in this paper.
Definition 4 below extends the concept of mnbp in (4) to minimum no-blocking frontier (MNBF), and mgp in (5) to (weakly) efficient generated-payoffs (EGP). Recall that a payoff vector u is unblocked by S if u S ∉V(S)\∂V(S) or if u∈[V(S)\∂V(S)]
C ×R −S ⊂ R n , where superscript C denotes the complement of a set. Let
denote the set of payoff vectors that are unblocked by all S ≠ N. Then, the core or (13) becomes C(Γ)=∂V(N)∩UBP, and the concepts of MNBF and EGP can be defined below.
Definition 4: Given game (12), let its GP and UBP be given in (15) and (17). Let MNBF denote its minimum no-blocking frontier and EGP its efficient generated-payoffs.
Then, MNBF and EGP are given by (18)
MNBF = MNBF(Γ) = { y∈UBP |  no x ∈ UBP such that x<<y}, and (19) EGP =EGP(Γ)=∂GP(Γ)= {y∈GP|  no x∈ GP such that x>>y}.
By (18), MNBF is the lower boundary or the minimum weakly efficient set of UBP.
Any payoff vector on (or above) this boundary is unblocked by all S≠N, this is analogous to the TU result that any solution of (4) given in (9) 
Theorem 4: Given game (12), let Z = Z(Γ) be given in (20). Then, Z ≠ ∅.
It is straightforward to see that EGP* = {{1, 2, 3}; {2, 2, 2}; {3,2,1}} in Example 2. 8 One can check that none of these three vectors is blocked, so MNBF∩EGP≠ ∅ holds in the example. Theorem 5: Given Γ in (12), let its core, GP and MNBF be given in (13), (15) and (18) respectively. Then, the following three claims hold:
(
ii) C(Γ) = ∅ if v(N) ⊂ GP\∂GP; and (iii) C(Γ) ≠ ∅ ⇔ there exists x∈∂v(N) and y∈ MNBF such that x ≥ y.
Comparing Theorem 5 with Theorem 2 leads to the following two differences and one similarity between NTU and TU core results: i) balancedness is only a sufficient condition for NTU core existence (Scarf [1967b] ), and a necessary and sufficient condition for TU core existence (Bondareva [1962] , Shapley [1967] ); ii) the irrationality of choosing from V(N) is only a sufficient condition for an empty NTU core, whereas the irrationality of splitting v(N) is a necessary and sufficient condition for an empty TU core; and iii) "V(N) has a payoff vector on or above MNBF" is a necessary and sufficient condition for NTU core existence, and "v(N) ≥ mnbp" is a necessary and sufficient condition for TU core existence (Zhao [2001] ). As with the TU case, the irrationality of choosing u∈ V(N) ⊂ GP\∂GP suggests the need to modify previous studies on NTU games with an empty core.
The NTU counterpart of a TU game's maximal payoff in (8) is the following concept of efficient payoffs:
Definition 6: The set of efficient payoffs (EP) for our NTU game (12) is given by (21) EP = EP(Γ)=∂ (GP∪v(N))= {y∈GP∪v(N) |  no x∈GP∪v(N) with x>>y}, where GP = GP(Γ) is the generated payoff given in (15).
Recall that players in a TU game will always split the maximal payoff defined in (8).
Similarly, players in a NTU game will always choose from the set of efficient payoffs defined in (21). This answers the question of what subset of payoffs from which players will choose.
Next, consider the question of how to choose a payoff vector from EP. Let (ii) the set of stable payoff vectors in EP(Γ) is given by
C(Γ)∪Z(Γ)* if V(N)⊄ GP; GP⊄ V(N); C(Γ) ≠ ∅;
Z(Γ) if V(N)⊄ GP; GP⊄ V(N); C(Γ) = ∅; or if V(N)⊂ GP; where Z(Γ)* = Z(Γ)∩[V(N)\∂ V(N)] C , and C(Γ) is the core given in (13);
(iii) the set of stable collections of coalitions that will be formed is given by
where 
Conclusion and Discussion
The above analysis revealed the possibility that players in a coalitional game sometimes could achieve better payoffs than the grand coalition's payoffs by forming a minimal balanced collection of coalitions. Our exploration of such opportunity led to the concepts of maximal payoff (mp) and efficient payoffs (EP) in TU and NTU games, which will be better than the grand coalition's payoff if and only if the core is empty.
In addition to the new core argument, the exploration led to the following four conclusions: i) players will achieve the game's mp (EP) in TU (NTU) games; ii) the set of stable payoffs is equal to the core if the core is non-empty and is equal to the optimal set of mnbp (the set of unblocked and efficient generated-payoffs) in TU ( We will show that (25) is equivalent to the maximization problem (5). First, we show that the inequality constraints in (25) can be replaced by equation constraints.
Let Ay≤ e and y≥0 denote the constraints in (25) We will show that z is an extreme point of (26) . Assume again by way of contradiction that The above two expressions show that both w and w' are balancing vectors for some subcollections of B. Because B is minimal, one must have w = w' = z, which contradicts w ≠ w'. Therefore, z must be an extreme point of (26) .
Finally, by the standard results in linear programming, the maximal value of (26) is achieved among the set of its extreme points, which are equivalent to the set of the minimal balanced collections, so (26) 
Proof of Theorem 4:
Let UBP be the set of unblocked payoffs in (17), and EGP be the boundary or (weakly) efficient set of the generated payoff in (19). We shall first show that UBP∩ EGP ≠ ∅. By the definition of (14) and (15) 
For each coalition S≠ N, let W S = {Int V(S)×R −S }∩EGP be an open (relatively in
EGP) subset of EGP, where Int V(S) = V(S)\∂V(S) is the interior of V(S).
